

# MAXIMIZING NATO FOR THE WAR ON TERROR

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP CAN STRENGTHEN THE TRANSATLANTIC  
RELATIONSHIP BY DEFINING AND PURSUING SHARED  
HOMELAND SECURITY INTERESTS



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## Preface

Mark Twain was right when he quipped that history does not repeat itself, but that it can rhyme. Twenty years ago the most successful alliance in American history confronted the perilous and unconventional threat of terrorism. In the 1980s, terrorists bombed the North Atlantic Assembly Headquarters and the NATO Support Center, assassinated a NATO general in Paris, and wounded seventy U.S. servicemen in a bomb attack in Greece and fifty American civilians in Germany. Instead of the Soviet Union, however, Libya aided and abetted terrorist attacks against NATO; an unconventional threat located far from its normal geographic reach.

The front lines had changed, and NATO adapted. I was there as U.S. Ambassador to NATO at the time and can see the similarities today. The lessons are unavoidable.

Then, as now, the U.S. confronted differences with its Allies on the perception of the threat posed by terrorism. Discerning NATO's *raison d'être* had already become a familiar argument. Indeed, marshaling America's Allies to respond to and prevent terrorism became a pivotal development in NATO's consensus-based approach to security. With Presidential leadership, creative use of NATO's consultative structures, and coherent employment of the U.S. national security apparatus – including the Departments of State and Defense, the FBI, and the CIA – NATO adapted and proved its worth in a new threat environment.

Today's threat environment, shaped by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the forward leaning policies of the Department of Homeland Security, among other developments, challenges NATO to its core. A NATO engaged in the war on terror, however, is not an end in itself. NATO is more than a military alliance; it was a political alliance, at first, and remains so today. America seeks to lead NATO in such a way that this historic alliance does more than add boots to the ground wherever the "front lines" may be. Nowhere else can the President engage 26 Allies, 20 Partners, and unique relationships with more than a dozen countries in the Mediterranean and Middle East in one place. NATO is, therefore, President Bush's best strategic option

for establishing dialogue, building a common risk assessment, and marshaling needed partners. The goal is to shift that coalition's mission from fighting the war on terror to winning it.

Maximizing NATO for the war on terror remains at a distance, but is not out of reach. This report presents the challenges inherent in leading NATO in this way. While eerily similar to the challenges President Reagan faced in the 1980s, certain options also exist for the President today. This report identifies five very specific policy options available to the President and the U.S. foreign policy leadership to help close the gaps that prevent greater transatlantic unity in the war on terror and to turn the corner in bringing NATO more fully into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Success, however, requires more than NATO. Looking across the Atlantic and beyond, the relationship between the European Union and the United States remains important in the war on terror.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States supported this initiative and deserves credit for making a direct contribution to the shared task of strengthening the transatlantic relationship in these challenging times. It serves as a model for other foundations and the Center is thankful for their support.

David M. Abshire  
President  
Center for the Study of the Presidency



## Acknowledgements

All those with whom the Project Team consulted for this project, and listed in Section III of this report, have our sincere thanks for sharing their time and candid input. Former NATO Ambassador David Abshire's experience and insights guided this project from its inception. Without his central role during the preparation of this report and the conduct of the Project Team's consultations and related research, these pages would be empty.

In Brussels, NATO Ambassador Nicholas Burns provided the Project Team with unique access to NATO leadership and informed the Team's work on the substance, history, and state of the transatlantic alliance in the war against terrorism. His continued leadership is a national asset. We also thank him for assigning Virginia Ruebensaal to be our handler. Diego Luis Palmer, Head of Planning for NATO's Operations Division, offered invaluable critiques for this report.

In Paris, Minister Counselor at the U.S. embassy Paul Maihlot provided important context for our consultations there. Pierre Drai and Alexandra Novosseloff at the French Ministry of Defence gave insightful comments to the Team, and Policy Planning Head at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gilles Andreani, graciously shared his ideas with us about the historical forces driving NATO-EU relations.

In London, we are grateful to His Grace the Duke of Westminster, whom, as Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Reserves and Cadets), discussed with us the civil defense capabilities in the UK. Admiral Cobbold, Jonathan Eyal, Sandra Bell, and Mark Joyce of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies have our gratitude for co-hosting a seminar with the Project Team on "NATO and the Fight Against Terrorism." Antony Phillipson, the Prime Minister's Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, gave us valuable assessments of the UK's view of NATO as part of a broader security initiative.

Finally, in Washington, Dennis Sequeira provided expert perspectives from the Office of International Affairs (OIA) at the Department of Homeland Security, as did OIA Director Ambassador Cresencio Arcos and Senior Adviser Michael Austin. At the Center, Research Assistant Alex Douville provided critical back-up and follow-through on numerous drafts, COO Thomas Kirlin provided editorial

suggestions, Tiffany Fountain patiently provided supporting research, Fawad Khan provided invaluable design assistance, and John Boyer and Ross Chanin contributed several proof readings. Salve Bernabe at the Richard Lounsbery Foundation, and Cora Mendoza, assistant to the president at CSP, are responsible for organizing the Team’s Europe schedule.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States made this project possible with their generous support. GMFUS is an American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to developing ideas, leaders, and institutions necessary for an effective long-term partnership between the United States and Europe. Without the intellectual guidance of GMFUS’ Ursula Soyez, and encouragement of Maia Comeau and Nicola Hagen, this project would not have taken place.

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## Executive Summary

In mid-2004, a small senior Project Team <sup>1</sup> from the Center for the Study of the Presidency consulted with government leaders, senior policy experts, and high-level practitioners in Paris, Brussels, London, and Washington. This initiative arose from a meeting in the regularly held homeland security roundtable series at the Center.

In March 2004, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Border and Transportation Security met with a diverse group of experts at CSP on the international challenges of homeland security, and discovered a serious disconnect between the Departments of Homeland Security, State, and Defense concerning the North Atlantic Council. It became clear that while State and Defense traditionally share the NATO mission, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had yet to find and define its role there. Beyond the bureaucratic implications, this disconnect has impaired the U.S. approach to NATO and other multilateral entities in pursuit of important U.S. homeland security interests.

The result has been a further fraying of bilateral relationships between the U.S. and several traditional Allies, a downgrading of NATO consultative structures and programs, a greater divergence in agreed-upon priorities for ever-scarce security dollars, and a widening gap between how America and other NATO members separately perceive the risk of terrorism.

In subsequent efforts, the Project Team focused on barriers to cooperation through the North Atlantic Council and its auxiliary structures in the global fight against terrorism. The Team identified policy options for pursuing common homeland security objectives, sharing best-counterterrorism practices with other NATO members and Partners, and developing security competencies related to fighting terrorism. In December 2004, the Project Team compiled its Initial Findings Report based on those consultations.

No longer the linear, containable threat of communism and the Cold War, NATO's enemy is potentially deadlier and certainly more diffuse. To prevail, Allies and Partners need NATO's valuable capabilities and consultative structures more than ever before. No other alliance apparatus offers the same high quality and quantity of support.

A commitment to do so already is in place. On September 11, 2001, NATO issued a statement affirming that, “the U.S. can rely on its Allies in North America and Europe for assistance and support. NATO solidarity remains the essence of our Alliance. Our message to the people of the United States is that we are with you.” By all accounts, that solidarity has since declined. Cooperation in the Alliance has given way to skepticism and, in some cases, outright mistrust. Add to this the strains of competing priorities for defense dollars across Europe, as well as a widening gap in perceptions of the threats faced, and the result resembles more a great division than an alliance.

Despite having invoked the Alliance’s mutual defense clause (Article V) following the 9/11 attacks, NATO risks becoming a victim of its own Cold War success. Member nations must see the value of using NATO structures – in coordination with the European Union and others – to achieve three interlocking security objectives:

- deterring, co-opting, and destroying terrorist organizations,
- developing more effective emergency response capabilities and contingencies, and
- improving information sharing throughout its growing territory that includes unique relationships with the Middle East.

NATO is not the sole avenue for building a transatlantic dialogue and action agenda on counter- and anti-terrorism. Similar structures of the European Union can serve a critical role. Security efforts developed and pursued through NATO or the EU should be viewed as complimentary, not competitive with one another. However, such an effort should consider NATO’s clear advantages: Its much larger outreach mechanisms include Members, Partners, and those countries participating in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative, which establishes ties between more than 50 different countries in a unique diplomatic atmosphere.

A primary challenge includes overcoming two misplaced suspicions. The first, held by some in the U.S., is the fear that the EU harbors an intent to obviate the need for Europeans to depend on NATO by duplicating structures and diminishing NATO’s potential role beyond Cold War-type confrontations. The second, considered to be a European perspective, is the suspicion that the United States opposes European strategic aspirations for greater integration.

Secretary of State Rice's early 2005 visit to Europe and the President's February trip there constitute a productive step toward addressing European doubts about U.S. support for greater integration on the Continent. NATO today, however, remains largely untapped as a resource for realizing a broader global security vision needed to better protect against, if not defeat, global terrorism. While the Alliance possesses uniquely successful structures for marshaling Allies, building unity of purpose, and achieving historic victories, NATO could serve America and her Allies' modern national security interests much more effectively.

Establishing consensus on the nature of the threat – and, ultimately, the best strategy to defeat it – is not out of reach. The U.S. can rebuild its historic solidarity with NATO Allies and Partners. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer asserted during his meeting with the CSP Project Team that collective defense “*and solidarity remain NATO's core mission.*” NATO can best serve Allies in combating terrorism, however, only if the North Atlantic Council and other bodies within NATO's constellation of consultative structures are sufficiently elevated and reinvigorated. Presently, these structures are under-utilized in the global fight against terrorism.

Strengthening homeland security throughout the NATO map is vital to deterring and preventing terrorist attacks. Developing greater competency, confidence, and trust is a fundamental ingredient of success in this area. NATO, if led to do so, could rapidly and uniformly develop the capabilities required to deter, diminish, and possibly defeat the transnational terrorist threat.

This report identifies five policy options that could help move the Alliance in this direction:

- A “reinforced” North Atlantic Council with added cabinet presence – such as the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security and Ally counterparts – could augment in a parallel and perhaps more effective fashion those consultations taking place at the EU. Today, the model of a reinforced NAC can address differences in threat perception among Allies and help secure a successful transition for NATO into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. An elevated NAC could galvanize the Alliance on mutually beneficial counterterrorism efforts rather than modest preparedness-oriented investments. Ultimately, the

result could be a more aggressive approach by NATO to support Iraqi security institutions, a broader and deeper investment in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and more effective spending on respective homeland security-related measures that build needed resilience and deterrence capabilities throughout the Alliance.

- The Security Through Science Programs and the NATO Trust Funds are two under-utilized NATO programs that hold significant promise but remain mired in bureaucratic misuse or simple neglect. This report explains how these programs could better connect current NATO counterterrorism measures to the war on terrorism at minimal comparable costs with considerable returns on monetary and political investments.
- NATO should reintroduce elevated, yet informal, senior consultative groups – as it did in the face of terrorism in the 1980s – to shift Alliance investments toward capabilities more relevant to protecting civilians *as well as troops* against the worst forms of terrorism. These consultative groups would conduct a mutual assessment of the threat and risk posed by terrorism today.
- The U.S. Department of Homeland Security should articulate its own international strategy to, among other things, make better use of multilateral organizations such as NATO to bring greater coherence and efficiency to the Department’s pursuit of U.S. Homeland Security interests at home and abroad.

<sup>1</sup> The Project Team includes David Abshire, President of the Center for the Study of the Presidency; Director of Homeland Security Projects Jonah Czerwinski; Special Assistant to the President Wesley Cross; and Maxmillian Angerholzer III, Program Director and Secretary of the Richard Lounsbury Foundation. Appendix C provides biographical information.

# **I. Recommendations**

## **1. Hold Regular Meetings of a “Reinforced” North Atlantic Council**

When in the 1980s terrorists bombed the North Atlantic Assembly Headquarters and the NATO Support Center, assassinated a NATO three-star general on the Champs Elysees, wounded seventy U.S. servicemen in a bomb attack in Greece and fifty American civilians in a West German bar, U.S. leadership engaged through NATO those members who had unwittingly given terrorists free passage. Libya, not the Soviet Union, proved to be the source of the threat. President Reagan launched a diplomatic effort to marshal Allies to confront Libya’s rogue government. Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead went to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to share intelligence indicting Libya. FBI Director William Webster moved into U.S. NATO Ambassador David Abshire’s residence for deep consultations with Allies. Much more effective than briefing only NATO Permanent Representatives, Deputy Secretary Whitehead and Director Webster met with their counterparts from NATO nations in the framework of reinforced meetings of the NAC.

After a bomb exploded onboard a TWA flight over Scotland, U.S. officials cited evidence of Libyan connivance to European Community (EC) foreign ministers. On 15 April 1986, the United Kingdom and the United States struck Libya.

This initial response excluded NATO because the target was then beyond NATO’s geographic focus. Afterward, the U.S. Permanent Representative explained to the North Atlantic Council how the strike fit within NATO’s counterterrorism objectives for Europe. Some Allies remained critical of the military action. After high-level diplomatic exchanges via the NAC, EC foreign ministers eventually agreed to curtail diplomatic missions to Libya. President Reagan praised the EC. Political rifts began to close. The NAC served as a venue to address philosophical and strategic differences, marshal members toward action, and solve political disagreements. Furthermore, NATO effectively bridged the U.S. and the EC while eventually turning a titular unilateral operation into a shared objective.

More recently, European Allies invoked Article V and sent a powerful political message immediately following al Qaeda's 2001 attacks in New York and Washington. The United States, however, missed an opportunity to mobilize the Alliance. Because defeating terrorism takes a multi-pronged approach, the U.S. needs NATO's members not just to share the burden in Iraq and Afghanistan. Equal parts offense and defense can render progress, but unity of effort remains the most vital ingredient.

The Project Team's consultations in European capitals addressed a deteriorating status quo. The apparent tug-of-war between the EU and NATO has frayed the Alliance at a time when its potential may be needed now more than it ever was during the Cold War. A "reinforced NAC" could help alleviate the current political stalemate permeating NATO's halls and the greater transatlantic relationship. In practice, those consultations could address critical issues such as homeland security and counterterrorism, which can be separated

***A "reinforced NAC" could help alleviate the political stalemate permeating NATO's halls and the greater transatlantic relationship.***

for now from the more polarizing debates about commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The elevated participation in NATO's consultative structures during the 1980s offers a model for today. Beyond traditional State Department and Pentagon

engagement of the NAC, however, U.S. Homeland Security leadership could avail itself of NATO's unique and far-reaching base to great effect. Defending against terrorism requires innovative approaches to deterrence, greater investments in resilience, and consultation on the nature and character of the risk posed by global terrorism. The onus is on both sides of the Atlantic, but some recent progress is promising.

The Center's Project Team returned from Europe and briefed the U.S. Homeland Security Secretary and his top aides about more creative use of the NAC. After meeting with Center leadership, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Admiral James Loy was dispatched in December 2004 to brief the North Atlantic Council on a range



of U.S. homeland security objectives. This was a productive start. However, to make progress in sharing counterterrorism lessons, best practices in emergency preparedness to defend citizens – not just forces – against the threat of terrorism, and to address differences in the perception of risk, all Ally nations must join the dialogue by including counterparts of the U.S. Deputy Secretary, such as Interior and Justice Ministers.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, inviting relevant EU ministers would help bridge the gap between Transatlantic and European security initiatives where terrorism is concerned. Such engagement would, as in the past, elevate critical policy disconnects above traditionally stovepiped avenues.

By convening a reinforced NAC of counterparts, the U.S. shows more than its willingness to listen; the perceived absence of which the

Project Team learned resulted in a tendency for Europeans to place NATO in a narrowly defined box for “hard security” only to be used in times of traditional conflict. The reinforced NAC in practice takes a serious step toward learning from Allies which practices have succeeded and which have failed while opening a more productive dialogue between 26 Allies and 46 Partners on the challenges of securing the homeland against terrorism.

***By convening a reinforced NAC of counterparts, the U.S. does more than show its willingness to listen.***

Priorities for actual meetings of a reinforced NAC could include sharing intelligence and assessments of certain threats such as those against civilian aircraft, non-military government installations, and high-value national sites with frequent civilian presence. These contingencies sufficiently overlap military, political, and commercial interests to demand broad engagement across various competencies and national boundaries. In the context of a reinforced NAC, those present could bring to bear a wider variety of approaches to countering these threats by sharing best practices and perhaps relevant technology, including advanced radiation/explosive detection and surveillance. (Please see Recommendation 3 on redirecting NATO Science Programs for more on specific capabilities.)

On his final trip just two weeks before his last day in office, America's first Homeland Security Secretary made his fourth visit to Europe.<sup>2</sup> Secretary Tom Ridge met in Brussels with U.S. Ambassadors to NATO and the EU, as well as the American bilateral Ambassador. Only one counterpart, Britain's Home Secretary, was on the schedule.

On the morning of the trip, however, Secretary Ridge noted the vital importance of constructively engaging Allies and friends – specifically the European Union as an institution – in a multilateral context.<sup>3</sup> An over reliance on bilateral agreements, he explained, had in fact caused more harm than good. He cited the case of the negated negotiations over sharing Passenger Name Record data, which emerged during the Center's March 2004 Roundtable with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security in charge of the Europe negotiations. It was agreed that had DHS begun consulting Allies through security channels like NATO, two facts would have been clear at the outset: First, PNR data was as much about security as trade, and, second, that the European Commission should have been

***An over-reliance on bilateral agreements had in fact caused more harm than good.***

formally engaged initially instead of pursuing bilateral agreements with individual European countries.

The concept of elevated engagement through meetings of a reinforced NAC gained the support of the Secretary General during the Project Team's meeting with him. Permanent Representatives from Germany, Poland, Hungary, Canada, Bulgaria, and Belgium also personally expressed their support to the Project Team, several recalling first-hand involvement with the original cases in the 1980s.

NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investments described the importance of transforming the Alliance's defense capabilities toward those more relevant to defeating terrorism and suggested to the Project Team that regular meetings of a reinforced NAC could elevate the transformation debate to the political level and above the traditional venue of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD).<sup>4</sup>

Others with whom the Project Team met stressed that laying the groundwork for such engagement requires significant planning and a strategy to build momentum by initially avoiding politically sensitive subjects and addressing more accessible issues mostly within the spectrum of homeland security, such as prevention, preparedness, and emergency response.<sup>5</sup> The overall process should include an assessment of the highest political hurdles worth taking on later.

To begin work on the thornier and more complex issues, special consultative groups – intended to meet outside of official channels – offer an effective venue. By tapping expertise and perspectives in Ally capitals to address politically sensitive schisms with diminished political pressure, such groups can make progress in several areas for enhancing the transatlantic approach to 21st century threats. As described below, a model for this also exists.

<sup>1</sup>Appendix A names potential counterparts in office at the time of this writing.

<sup>2</sup> Previous official travel took place in January 2005 (Belgium, Netherlands, UK); September 2004 (Germany, UK, Netherlands); February 2004 (Italy); and October 2003 (Germany, Spain, Netherlands).

<sup>3</sup>The Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a discussion on the international dimensions of homeland security with Secretary Tom Ridge on Jan. 10, 2005.

<sup>4</sup> NATO efforts to collaborate in the research, development, and production of military equipment and systems occur under the auspices of the CNAD, which is chaired permanently by the Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investments.

<sup>5</sup> NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) would offer productive input to this process. Created in 1998, the EADRCC conducts annual field and table-top exercises to enhance Ally and Partner (including Russia) disaster response capabilities. These exercises develop needed competencies following a terrorist attack, and give Partner nations the possibility to interact and train more frequently and more effectively. A number of these countries, however, lack sufficient equipment, training, and planning because insufficient budgets among participating nations persist despite slight improvements since 2001.

To its credit, the EADRCC, which spans NATO and Partner nations, has organized "lessons learned" activities to develop capabilities related to incidents involving CBRN scenarios. Furthermore, a 2003 EADRCC seminar in Dubrovnik convened to "develop cooperation with other international organisations and how to avoid unnecessary duplication." Thirty-four nations participated in this seminar. While France did not attend, the European Union was among the other six participating international organizations, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for

the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Stability Pact, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and NATO itself.

## **2. Institute Informal Special Consultative Groups**

When the Soviet Union aimed intermediate-range missiles at the heart of Europe in an attempt to challenge the transatlantic nuclear deterrent, most in NATO – including the U.S. – put forth a strategy to counter-deploy similar weapons, including cruise missiles. Three NATO members objected, thus forcing a stalemate. In addition to a considerable public diplomacy campaign, a Special Consultative Group of political directors from member nations convened to devise a solution outside of normal NAC deliberations.

Under the chairmanship of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt private, off-the-record sessions allowed Allies to express reservations, weigh advantages against disadvantages, float innovative alternatives, and share respective political realities surrounding counter-deployment in each country. Allies ultimately arrived at an agreement that included a combination of counter-deployments against the Soviet missiles and explanations to member publics that resulted in an effective response to Soviet escalation without a confrontation. NATO prevailed by carefully orchestrating its collective will. That will remains today, but it must be creatively mustered for the new threat environment.

In meetings held at the French Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, in Brussels with the German NATO Ambassador, other senior NATO representatives and at 10 Downing, the Project Team suggested reinstating similar Special Consultative Groups. Such unofficial yet high-level groups today would address the disconnects between the Alliance's strained defense outlays (that continue to service what a senior NATO official calls "peacetime" goals) and the very obtainable capabilities needed to protect civilians against the worst forms of terrorism. Similarly, a reconstituted Special Consultative Group could take on the difficult task of devising a mutual assessment of the common danger posed by global terrorism for which the Alliance must be readied and reoriented.

The President should appoint the new U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to organize a new Special Consultative Group (SCG) to encompass NATO's 26 Allies for this purpose. After building sufficient momentum, the SCG could incorporate the 20 Partner nations into broader consultations before engaging such critical relationships as NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, France's High Committee for Civil Defence, and other EU entities.<sup>1</sup> NATO's June 2004 Istanbul Summit lays the groundwork for pursuing a similarly inclusive approach.<sup>2</sup>

***Appoint the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to organize Special Consultative Groups.***

For a new NATO threat assessment to serve its purpose, or even to take place at all, the effort should be considered on-going and form part of a larger consultative process resulting in a revised NATO Strategic Concept, which is already slated for official review and renewal. Moreover, Special Consultative Groups could be set up for failure by taking on various disconnects currently eroding NATO's consensus-building capabilities, such as commitments in Iraq, uneven defense spending levels, and various unmet goals under the Secretary General's Defense Capabilities Initiative.<sup>3</sup>

Two opportunities for success, however, are within reach. NATO Science Programs offer promising potential for closing much of the new capabilities gap within the homeland security spectrum, i.e. terrorism preparedness, detection, interdiction, and emergency response. If done correctly, a revived and reoriented NATO Science that augments rather than overlaps such functions as the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) and NATO's WMD Center would generate significant progress.

<sup>1</sup> Partnership for Peace countries include Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Macedonia), Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

The Mediterranean Dialogue includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.

The French High Committee for Civil Defence reports to the Ministry of the Interior, examines gaps in relevant research and development, and assembles best practices to modernize civilian defense for France and other European territories.

Relevant EU organizations might include the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), which has assumed responsibility for the guidance and direction of all EU military matters; the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), which develops EU strategic planning and provides military expertise as directed by the EUMC; and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, which supplies political counsel for non-military aspects of crisis management and conflict prevention.

<sup>2</sup> NATO established the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative on 28 June 2004 to facilitate cooperation between participating Middle East nations in counter-terrorism, border security, counter-WMD, disaster and civil emergency planning, training and education, participation in certain NATO exercises, and promoting military interoperability. The ICI does not supercede, but compliments the existing Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and the Mediterranean Dialogue.

<sup>3</sup> Launched in April 1999, the Secretary General's Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) seeks to develop Alliance defense capabilities for 21<sup>st</sup> century missions in five areas: humanitarian assistance, force protection and combat operations; deployment and mobility; logistics and prolonged operations; CBRN; and interoperable command, control and communications.

### **3. Reinvest In and Better Apply NATO Science Programs for the War on Terror**

Owing largely to superior scientific innovation, the West has benefited and indeed triumphed. Admiral Karl Doenitz, creator of Germany's U-boat fleet and commander of its Navy in World War II, conceded that defeat came "through superiority in the field of science."<sup>1</sup> NATO support for science as an avenue to greater security has proven effective, but a new security environment requires a new direction.

The North Atlantic Council agreed to a new concept for NATO science following the June 2003 NATO Science Committee meeting in Kiev. It initiated "Security Through Science" in 2004 to replace the NATO Science Program, which the Alliance had operated since 1958.<sup>2</sup>

NATO's Security Through Science supports international collaboration between scientists within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council or the Mediterranean Dialogue whose research contributes to "security, stability and solidarity among nations."<sup>3</sup> Research

funded by the Security Through Science program falls within two relevant subject areas:

- Defense Against Terrorism
- Countering Other Threats to Security

In addition to providing near-term security benefits, a deeper and wider sharing of expertise through NATO's science programs is possible. It would contribute significantly toward establishing confidence among struggling Allies and Partners, especially those along the eastern and southern rims. Certain counterterrorism capabilities – developed through malleable programs within NATO Science – increase competence and further open the door to cultivating trust among the Partners and those countries participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue.

Many newer Allies and Partners – especially those formerly part of the Soviet Union – depend on such NATO Science programs as the NATO Fellows, which have been almost entirely cut from the NATO budget, to help reverse the “brain drain” and reinvest in their economies. Nevertheless, NATO Fellowships could become more relevant by focusing directly on the areas most needed to fight terrorism. These include disciplines such as nuclear physics, chemical, nuclear, and mechanical engineering, as well as computing, systems, and information science. Large groups of legacy subject areas should be eliminated in order to apply resources to more urgent areas. Examples of such outdated Fellowships include astronomy, mathematics, oceanography, social sciences, and behavioral sciences.

NATO Science can enhance civil emergency planning capabilities – combined with a focus on building greater resilience and readiness – with little relative diplomatic energy and financial commitment. Eventually, civil defense and counterterrorism interests could reflect Alliance interests as a whole, making long term NATO-centric objectives more obtainable. For example, better developed and integrated civil emergency planning and disaster response capabilities could establish a high-level dialogue and enough good will to pave the way for basing agreements, greater transparency throughout the Alliance, and even broader burden sharing in such crucial theaters as Afghanistan and Iraq.

Presently constituted, however, NATO Science risks redundancy and severe budget cuts. The Science Through Security programs must better coordinate its activities with other relevant Committees, such as the SCEPC. Even though senior leadership of the Science programs rightly articulate an interest in honing efforts to improve counter-terrorism capabilities throughout the Alliance, the programs risk becoming duplicative of other efforts and stovepiped within the NATO bureaucracy. For example, recent meetings on emergency response organized by the Science Program failed to coordinate with the SCEPC, which is responsible for NATO's emergency preparedness efforts in this area and home to the Alliance's relevant expertise since 1956. Similarly, the NATO Pipeline Committee was not invited to participate in a NATO Science meeting on critical infrastructure and securing the NATO pipeline against terrorist

***Strengthened  
counterterrorism  
capabilities – developed  
through NATO Science  
– further open the door to  
cultivating trust among  
Allies and Partners.***

attack. Such duplication and disorganization has resulted in an effort – primarily by the U.S. – to cut the financial support for NATO Science entirely.

In the Project Team's meeting with him, NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Defense

Investments (ASG/DI) presented a list of technologies and capabilities he believes to be as relevant and mutually beneficial to Europe and the U.S as conventional force structure investments. Those advances cohere very closely with some of the near-term program objectives offered by the NATO Science Program.<sup>4</sup>

The Project Team met with the Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Science Cooperation and the Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, both of whom oversee NATO Science, to discuss potential new roles for the Alliance's collective science and technology programs, including Security through Science, the NATO Research and Technology Organization, and others.<sup>5</sup> The Project Team agreed that before ending NATO Science, a complete review of those programs could uncover potential new directions and avenues to reinforce other Alliance initiatives with common



goals. Specifically, the U.S. should lead NATO Science toward more effective partnerships with Alliance structures, including the ASG/DI, SCEPC, EADRCC, and others, to generate a multiplying effect that better reflects shared homeland security objectives.

As part of this effort, the Project Team organized a seminar with the London-based Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) on the transatlantic relationship in the war on terrorism and shared homeland security interests. The Project Team encouraged RUSI to conduct an outside review of NATO Science that would inform policymakers about how best to refocus these efforts away from redundancy before being phased out entirely. Through a grant from the Richard Lounsbery Foundation, RUSI initiated a project in late 2004 with the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique entitled “Science and Technology for a Transforming Alliance.” After subsequent consultations, the U.S. NATO Ambassador agreed to await the study’s findings before pursuing total funding cuts.

<sup>1</sup> Bernard Brodie and Fawn Brodie, *From Crossbow to H-Bomb* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973) 220.

<sup>2</sup> “NATO-Ukraine Science Cooperation.” No Date. Online image. [NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society](http://www.nato.int/ccms/2003/031013-toronto/nato-ukraine-science-cooperation.pdf). January 2005 <<http://www.nato.int/ccms/2003/031013-toronto/nato-ukraine-science-cooperation.pdf>>

<sup>3</sup> [Overview](http://www.nato.int/science/about.htm). The NATO Programme for Security Through Science. January 2005 <<http://www.nato.int/science/about.htm>>

<sup>4</sup> The ASG/DI’s list subsequently received support at NATO’s Istanbul Summit and included capabilities to detect and prevent such threats as car-bombs and improvised explosive devices, shoulder-fired missiles, and terrorist use of speedboats and underwater means such as divers against harbors and ships.

<sup>5</sup> NATO Science Through Security leadership shared their “Priority Research Topics” with the Project Team, which included rapid detection of CBRN agents and weapons, biodefense, and medical countermeasures to terrorist threats.

#### **4. Broaden and Elevate NATO Trust Funds**

The NATO Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism, unanimously adopted in November 2002, charges Allies and Partners to “Establish/ contribute to PfP Trust Funds ... to assist individual member states

in specific efforts against terrorism.... These projects will be implemented as a matter of priority.”<sup>1</sup> By nearly all accounts provided to the Project Team, this has not taken place in the more than two years since the Action Plan was signed.

NATO Trust Funds serve as an important mechanism for Members and Partner nations to collaborate on non-combat security initiatives. Trust Funds (TFs) sponsor a specific project, each of which is led by a NATO Member or Partner who is responsible for building the “political and financial support” to carry out the project.<sup>2</sup> Any nation or organization may contribute resources to a specific project, which includes non-NATO entities such as non-

***Trust Funds could augment Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, the Megaports Initiative, and the Proliferation Security Initiative.***

government organizations and inter-governmental organizations, among others. The U.S. has never sponsored a NATO Trust Fund project.<sup>3</sup>

The U.S. and other larger NATO members could seek to enfranchise newer Members and Partners with more robust civil emergency planning (CEP) initiatives and

investments via the TFs. Moreover, strategic use of TF programs could be pursued in combination with renewed NATO Security Through Science programs. According to senior authorities at NATO headquarters, positive reinforcements to gradually encourage French participation must be a part of the equation.

Trust Funds historically focus on managing the various impacts of defense reform, such as de-mining and training exercises. Today, according to NATO officials involved in establishing and operating TFs across Europe, the scope of the TF program remains vague – and this can be an asset. Overcoming entrenched resistance to dramatically shifting Alliance investments and strategic priorities toward homeland security and counterterrorism requires creative use of more flexible mechanisms like the Trust Funds. If used effectively, the Trust Funds would help to develop the following among the newer rim of Members, the greater EAPC, and the Mediterranean Dialogue:

- More sophisticated counter- and antiterrorism competencies,
- Confidence in the U.S. commitment to the Alliance and the Partnership for more than typical burden-sharing, and, eventually,
- A deeper sense of trust between the U.S. and a larger segment of NATO and the Partner nations.

Several senior USNATO and international staff agreed that, ultimately, greater trust can foster a NATO community that is more receptive to discussing such strategic – and presently polarizing – issues as threat perception. As a result, NATO’s defense investments could eventually assume a broader approach to enhancing competencies relevant to waging and winning the war against terrorism (i.e. prevention, information sharing, emergency response, resilience capabilities, detection of radiological/nuclear, chemical, and biological agents, etc). For example, TFs could augment activities under the Nunn-Lugar program, the Megaports Initiative, the Second Line of Defense Program, and the broader Proliferation Security Initiative, among others.<sup>4</sup> To do so would require deep coordination between numerous U.S. government agencies with international operations such as these.

<sup>1</sup> NATO Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism, § 16.5.2.

<sup>2</sup> Partnership for Peace Trust Fund. NATO Partnership for Peace. January, 2005. <<http://www.nato.int/pfp/trust-fund.htm>>

<sup>3</sup> Appendix B illustrates status of NATO Trust Funds.

<sup>4</sup> The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, passed by Congress in 1991, destroys WMD stockpiles in the former Soviet Union and plans to expand its mandate to Albania, a Partnership for Peace member.

Under the Megaports Initiative, the U.S. partners with the world’s busiest ports to prevent terrorists from using international shipping to smuggle nuclear or radioactive materials to the U.S. The Second Line of Defense Program works with foreign partners to patrol border crossings, airports, and seaports with raditaion detectors and soon will begin operating in Ukraine.

The Proliferation Security Initiative, created on 31 May 2003, is designed to prevent the spread of WMD and their related technologies. This program allows the U.S. and its Allies to search ships and planes suspected to contain these materials using established international guidelines and to seize materials when necessary.

## **5. Create an International Strategy for the Department of Homeland Security**

Several lessons have become clear to both the architects of the Department of Homeland Security and their critics. Among the tougher lessons is the recognition that the prevailing concept of the “homeland” was too narrow when creating the new Department. Indeed, most of the issues concerning the new homeland security bureaucracy – including border protection, port and cargo security, immigration, and even public health – draw the Department into an international dimension involving foreign countries and their cooperation.

Despite having staffed an Office of International Affairs (OIA), and the recent consolidation of that office under a new Assistant Secretary, DHS international activities remain stovepiped and limited by unclear authorities and priorities, organizational competition throughout the Department, and – perhaps most damaging – poor coordination between DHS and the two primary agencies responsible for foreign

affairs: The Departments of State and Defense.

***Most issues concerning the new Homeland Security bureaucracy involve foreign countries and their cooperation.***

Solving this disconnect begins at the National Security Council and the White House Homeland Security Council. Since the Cold War ended,

dimensions of the national security spectrum began expanding such that new trends and threats entered into the decisionmaking equation, including volatility in capital markets, pervasive dual-use technology developments, biodefense, cyber warfare, and the list continues. Gradually, and more rapidly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the homeland security spectrum took shape. With it, the Executive Branch, and to a lesser extent the Congress, adapted. After various organizational measures, including creating the Department of Homeland Security, the process continues. Where that process frays is at the interagency level.

The very nature of homeland security remains its tendency to cut across numerous disciplines, which can convulse a vertically

organized institution like the Executive Branch. The State – Defense – Homeland Security disconnect poses an entirely new dynamic in need of immediate engagement by the President. While interagency working groups, task forces, and coordinating committees – primarily operating out of the White House – attempt to bridge these gaps, a major piece of the puzzle is missing. Reconciling the role of DHS at the North Atlantic Council represents just one possible way of overcoming this disconnect. The NSC and HSC should take the lead in developing a new strategy for DHS.

Experts recently have addressed this disconnect, but primarily from an organizational perspective.<sup>1</sup> While clarifying authorities within the Department would help discipline the dysfunctional status quo, DHS leadership could augment its February 2004 “Strategic Plan” by articulating the Department’s own international strategy.

The strategic Plan articulates a mission statement charging the Department with leading a “ unified national effort to secure America.” Yet no document other than the National Homeland Security Strategy tells how the Department might do this. Unfortunately, that National Strategy, published in 2002, preceded the war with Iraq and numerous subsequent international counter-terrorism operations and initiatives under the Departments of Energy, Defense, State, and Homeland Security, among others.<sup>2</sup> A review of the overall strategy and a clear statement of DHS’s true role and authorities are overdue.

<sup>1</sup> Reporting out in December 2004, a taskforce of representatives from academia, research centers, the private sector, and congressional staff, which was chaired by homeland security experts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and The Heritage Foundation, examined the organization and operations of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security based on four criteria: management, roles and missions, authorities, and resources. The taskforce report, *DHS 2.0*, is located at:

- [http://www.csis.org/hs/041213\\_dhsv2.pdf](http://www.csis.org/hs/041213_dhsv2.pdf)
- <http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=72759>

<sup>2</sup>The Department of State’s “Project Horizon” identifies over 30 federal agencies operating globally.



## II. Vital Next Steps

CSP plans to collaborate with select partner organizations in Washington and key Allied capitals to foster NAC consensus in the transatlantic response to terrorism. The follow-on initiative will address three specific policy challenges facing the transatlantic relationship in general and the North Atlantic Council in particular:

1. Unifying NATO Threat Perception and Risk Assessment;
2. Reconciling America's "War on Terror" with Europe's "Fight Against Terrorism;" and
3. Improving Transatlantic Communications.

### **1. Unifying NATO Threat Perception and Risk Assessment**

Despite progress at its 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO defense investments must focus more concretely on those capabilities that protect both troops as well as civilians against 21st-century terrorism. To do so requires elevating this strategic concern to the proper political levels, including the NAC. Because it still operates under its 1999 Strategic Concept, it also requires that the Alliance intellectually recalibrate.

Both Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer and then-U.S. NATO Ambassador Burns described to the Project Team an institutional rigidity and political suspicion within official channels that prevents productive dialogue on these concerns. They agreed that to move beyond past diplomatic enmity requires a second track of consultation modeled after the Special Consultative Groups employed by then-NATO Ambassador David Abshire to reconcile perceptions of a common strategic threat in the 1980s.

CSP will assemble officials from Europe and North America to address the "perception gap" in pursuit of a common risk analysis and resources strategy, beginning with the set goal of protecting our respective homelands. Moreover, subsequently elevating this issue through a reinforced NAC with allied security ministers and their counterparts would be constructive in shaping a needed resources strategy for fighting terrorism. The Secretary General offered to use

this CSP effort to convene an official analysis of the terrorist threat and the risks posed by it. Ultimately, such a review could lay the foundation for NATO's new Strategic Concept.

## **2. Reconciling America's "War on Terror" with Europe's "Fight Against Terrorism"**

All NATO members agree that to combat global terrorism demands deep international cooperation. Yet, America and Europe remain divergent in their views of the nature and urgency of the threat, the tools required to meet it, and the appropriate institutions for such a mission. A primary cause of this divergence remains the different historical experiences and perspectives on terrorism held by NATO Allies and their citizens. That America prosecutes a "war on terror" while Europe wages a "fight against terrorism" only emphasizes those differences, which have led to disagreements on NATO's security role in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The Project Team believes that NATO's military security capabilities can be better used in civilian and infrastructure protection in addition to traditional security commitments envisioned by Article V of the NATO Charter. Furthermore, EU law enforcement and intelligence structures can better complement NATO's proven capacities. Finally, the G8 economies are stakeholders, too, as Russia and Japan also could serve a pivotal role in establishing a more forward leaning 21<sup>st</sup>-century security posture among democracies.

The CSP Project Team plans to partner with Etienne Davignon, chairman of the Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels and the Bilderberg Group, to convene small senior roundtables that make recommendations for official groups to examine NATO-EU-G8 coordination in the war on terror. Involvement of the NATO Secretary General, the President of the European Commission, and the head of the 2005 UK G8 Presidency would help foster unity of effort, maximize respective contributions, and diminish institutional duplication.

## **3. Improving Transatlantic Communications**

On both sides of the Atlantic, inaccurate perceptions of the war on terror and the war in Iraq place a great strain on the transatlantic relationship. For many Americans, French and German opposition



to the war in Iraq overshadows valued European contributions to the ISAF in Afghanistan. To large segments of Europeans, American unilateralism, perceived insincerity and inaccuracy of President Bush's case for war in Iraq, and doubts about the authenticity of the coalition supporting the U.S. in that effort erode trust. Recent high-level U.S. efforts to shore up anti-Americanism in Europe indicate a willingness not only to move beyond recent troubled years, but possibly to acknowledge that the onus remains largely on the U.S.

The Project Team met last summer with NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy to discuss ways of reinvigorating public diplomacy efforts to younger European and American generations. In a subsequent meeting, NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer emphasized, among other subjects, the vital importance of communicating the Alliance's past and future to post-Cold War European and North American youth.

CSP, in conjunction with the "Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy to the Arab and Muslim World," has recommended the formation of a White House strategic communications architecture and creation of a non-profit Foundation for International Understanding to improve U.S. global communication, particularly among NATO Allies and its growing number of Middle East partners. CSP will help the Foundation's advisory board shape programming to specifically target German youth. Both efforts will directly impact how the U.S. communicates policy affecting the transatlantic relationship and will seek to positively influence U.S. and European public opinion in the coming year.



### **III. Project Team Consultations**

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U.S. Mission to the European Union

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Technology

Gilles Andreani, Head, Policy Planning, French Foreign Ministry

Cresencio Arcos, Director, Office International Affairs, DHS

Michael Austin, FEMA, Senior Advisor, Office of International  
Affairs, DHS

Joshua Batkin, Deputy Director, International Affairs, Emergency  
Preparedness and Response Directorate (FEMA), DHS

Sandra Bell, Head of Homeland Security and Resilience Department,  
Royal United Services Institute

Marshall Billingslea, Assistant Secretary General for Defense  
Investment

Alberto Bin, Head, Regional Affairs and Mediterranean Dialogue  
Section, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division,  
International Secretariat (Mediterranean Dialogue)

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North Atlantic Council

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Planning Division, USNATO

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Keith Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary General of NATO for  
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Penny Satchez-Brohs, USNATO, US Civil Emergency Planning  
Officer (DHS)

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General

Kyle Scott, Political Minister Counselor, U.S. Mission to the  
European Union

Dennis Sequeira, Policy Advisor, Europe and Multilateral Affairs,  
OIA/DHS

Charles Skinner, Political Counsellor, U.S. Embassy, London

Dan Sreebny, Minister Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S.  
Embassy, London

Dominique Struye de Swielande, Belgium Permanent  
Representative to the North Atlantic Council

Field Marshal the Lord Vincent

His Grace the Duke of Westminster, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff  
(Reserves and Cadets)

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Mission to the EU

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Washington, DC

Captain David L. Wirt (USN), Defense and Naval Attaché, U.S.  
Embassy, London



## **IV. Appendixes**

### Appendix A: **Abbreviations**

ASG – Assistant Secretary General of NATO

ASG/DI – Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investments

CEP – Civil Emergency Planning

CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear

DHS – Department of Homeland Security

DOD – Department of Defense

DOS – Department of State

EADRCC – Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center

EAPC – Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

ESDP – European Security and Defense Policy

EU – European Union

EUCOM – United States European Command

GWOT – Global War on Terrorism

HSC – Homeland Security Council

ICI – Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

ISAF – International Security Assistance Force

KFOR – NATO Kosovo Force

MAP – Membership Action Plan

NAC – North Atlantic Council

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSC – National Security Council

OSD – Office of the Secretary of Defense

PfP – Partnership for Peace

PNR – Passenger Name Record data

SCEPC – Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee

SFOR – NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

SHAPE – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix B: **Potential Counterparts to Participate in Meetings of a Reinforced North Atlantic Council**

<u>Belgium</u>	-	Federal Public Service (FPS) Foreign Affairs Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht
<u>Bulgaria</u>	-	Minister of Justice, Anton Stankov (border security) Minister of the Interior, Georgi Petkanov
<u>Canada</u>	-	Minister of Justice and Attorney General, The Honorable Irwin Cotler
<u>Czech Republic</u>	-	Minister of the Interior, František Bublan Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, Pavel Nimec
<u>Denmark</u>	-	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Per Stig Møller
<u>Estonia</u>	-	Minister of the Interior, Margus Leivo
<u>EU</u>	-	High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana Counterterrorism Co-ordinator, Gijs de Vries
<u>France</u>	-	Minister of the Interior, Internal Security and Local Freedoms, Dominique de Villepin
<u>Germany</u>	-	Federal Ministry of the Interior, Otto Schily
<u>Greece</u>	-	Minister of Public Order, Georgios Voulgarakis



- Hungary - Minister of the Interior,  
Dr. Monika Lamperth  
Minister of Justice, Petréttei József
- Iceland - Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical  
Affairs, Björn Bjarnason
- Italy - Minister of Interior, Giuseppe Pisanu  
Minister of Justice, Roberto Castelli  
Minister of Regional Affairs,  
Enrico La Loggia
- Latvia - Minister of the Interior,  
Mr. Eriks Jekabsons
- Lithuania - Minister of the Interior,  
Vidmantas Ziemelis
- Luxembourg - Ministry for the Interior and Regional  
Planning, Jean-Marie Halsdorf  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and  
Immigration, Jean Asselborn  
Ministry for Justice, Luc Frieden
- Netherlands - Minister of the Interior and  
Kingdom Relations,  
Johannes Wijnandus (Johan) Remkes
- Norway - Minister of Justice and Police,  
Odd Einar Dorum
- Poland - Minister of Interior and Administration,  
Ryszard Kalisz

- Portugal - Minister for Internal Administration,  
Dr. António Luis Santos da Costa  
Minister for Justice,  
José Pedro Aguiar-Branco
- Romania - Minister of Justice,  
Monica Luisa Macovei
- Slovakia - Minister for Justice, Daniel Lipšic  
Minister of Interior, Vladimir Palko
- Slovenia - Minister of Justice, Louro Sturm
- Spain - Minister of Interior,  
José Antonio Alonso Suárez
- Turkey - Minister of Interior, Abdulkadir Aksu  
Minister of Justice, Cemil Cicek  
Minister of National Defense,  
Vecdi Gonul
- United Kingdom - Home Secretary, Charles Clarke
- United States - Secretary of Homeland Security,  
Michael Chertoff  
Director of National Intelligence,  
John Negroponte  
Director of the Federal Bureau of  
Investigation, Robert S. Mueller III

## Appendix C: **Status of NATO Trust Funds**

LEAD NATIONS	DESCRIPTION OF TRUST FUND PROJECT	STATUS	CONTRIBUTORS
<b>ONGOING PROJECTS</b>			
Albania II/Canada	6.5 million Euro, destruction of 11,650 tons of munitions for small arms and light weapons (SALW), incl. public awareness campaign, two workshops and the development of a PiP Trust Fund website	Start Dec. 2002	Albania, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, EU
Georgia/Luxembourg	1 million Euro, destruction of ground-air defense missiles	Start Nov. 2003	Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom
Azerbaijan/Turkey	1.46 million Euro; disposal and clearance of unexploded ordnance (UXO)	Start date subject to funding	Azerbaijan, Luxembourg, Norway, Slovenia, Turkey, UNDP
Belarus/Canada	390,500 Euro to destroy 700,000 anti-personnel landmines (APLs)	Start Jan. 2005	Belarus, Canada, Lithuania
Serbia and Montenegro/Canada & Austria*	SEEI Trust Fund; 1.69 million Euro for destruction of 1.320,620 APLs	Start Jan. 2005	Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, Switzerland
<b>PROJECTS UNDER DEVELOPMENT</b>			
Ukraine/Greece	Feasibility study to destroy 133,000 tons of munitions and 1.5 million SALW	Feasibility study completed, way forward under discussion	Germany, Greece, Turkey
Moldova/United Kingdom	Destruction of 1,712 tons chemicals	First part of feasibility study completed	Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom
<b>COMPLETED PROJECTS</b>			
Albania/Canada	800,000 \$US; 1.6 million APLs destroyed	Completed Apr. 2002	Albania, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom
Moldova/Netherlands	1.1 million \$US destruction of 11,872 APLs, 250 cubic meters of rocket fuel, safety training	Completed Dec. 2002	Canada, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom, United States
Tajikistan/Canada	3100 Euro, destruction of 1,261 APLs	Completed March 2004	Canada, Netherlands, Tajikistan
Ukraine/Canada	800,000 \$US, destruction of 400,000 APLs	Completed May 2003	Canada, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Ukraine
Serbia and Montenegro/Netherlands*	SEEI Trust Fund; 375,000 Euro, destruction of 28,000 SALW	Completed Nov 2003	Canada, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway

\* South Eastern Europe Initiative Trust Fund project.

Source: <http://www.nato.int/pfp/trust-fund-projects.pdf>.

## Appendix D: The Project Team

### **Dr. David M. Abshire**

David Abshire is President of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Vice Chairman of the Board of the bipartisan Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He was its co-founder in 1962, and served as its chief executive for many years.

Dr. Abshire served as Ambassador to NATO from 1983-1987, where he initiated a new net assessment of the Alliance, which was presented to top military and political leaders. In this post, Ambassador Abshire initiated a new conventional defense improvement effort allowing NATO to rely less heavily on nuclear weapons. For this, he was given the highest Defense Department civilian award – its Distinguished Public Service Medal. He returned from NATO in 1987 to serve as Special Counsellor to President Reagan with Cabinet rank and authority to meet with the President alone.

Dr. Abshire served as Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and later as Chairman of the U.S. Board of International Broadcasting. He was a member of the Murphy Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the President's Task Force on U.S. Government International Broadcasting.

He also is the co-convenor and a founding member of the Trinity National Leadership Roundtable, and currently serves as President of the Richard Lounsbery Foundation in New York City.

Dr. Abshire graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1951. In the Korean War, he served as a platoon leader, company commander, and division assistant intelligence officer. He received the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster with V for Valor, Commendation Ribbon with medal pendant, and Combat Infantry Badge. He received his Ph.D. in History from Georgetown University in 1959.

He has been decorated by five heads of state. In addition to the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, he was awarded the Presidential Citizens Medal.

### **Mr. Jonah J. Czerwinski**

Jonah Czerwinski is Senior Research Associate and Director of Homeland Security Projects at the Center for the Study of the Presidency. He directs the Homeland Security Roundtable, which regularly convenes leaders of the think tank community, academia, and private sector with senior Homeland

Security leadership of the Executive Branch. Mr. Czerwinski also directs a Center study on strengthening NATO's role in the global war on terrorism and a Center project on combating the smuggled nuclear threat. He is a 2005 Senior Fellow at the Homeland Security Policy Institute of George Washington University and was a 2004 Manfred Wörner Fellow.

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### **Mr. S. Wesley Cross II**

Mr. Cross is Special Assistant to the President and Special Projects Director at the Center for the Study of the Presidency. He aids in strategic planning, speech writing, correspondence, and project coordination – including the Center's forthcoming transatlantic initiative and the Center's Geo-Economic Initiative.

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**Mr. Maxmillian Angerholzer III**

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