

# **The Influence of the Considerations of Hearts and Minds on Eisenhower's Decision Not to Assist the French at Dien Bien Phu**

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As popular support for the war in Iraq wanes, journalists and politicians are comparing the situation to Vietnam more and more often. Obvious geographic and political problems arise for any historian attempting to compare the two, but similarities exist. There is no more similar aspect between the military actions in Iraq and Vietnam than the loss of public support. The human element must remain central to policy decisions in order to maximize efforts to combat insurgents and guerilla forces. The domestic popular support of military action, the popular support for multilateral action from our allies, and the hearts and minds of the peoples of the countries where we are conducting our operations must be considered. Memoirs from key members of the Eisenhower administration, historical accounts from soldiers at Dien Bien Phu and French foreign officers, and memos and correspondence from the US Senate and Foreign Service staff all display the clear fact that considerations of popular support at home and abroad were key to the Eisenhower's decision.

At the battle of Dien Bien Phu, Eisenhower made the decision not to support the French with air strikes, despite the fact that America had shouldered an enormous portion of the economic burden of the conflict. His considerations regarding popular support and hearts and minds would central to Eisenhower's decision. The condition of the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese was an important factor to the French's conflict and would be of crucial importance to any American intervention in the region, should they decide to reinforce the French. Eisenhower would only consider intervention if it was part of a multilateral effort including English and Australian support. Therefore, popular support for such a war would have to exist in our allied nations. Further, the United States could not openly support a conflict that would be in support of French imperialism. The unwillingness of the French to grant the Vietnamese their independence and share control of a joint military effort was at the forefront of the decision.

To understand the significance of the decision, it is necessary to have some background on the global climate in which Eisenhower made the decision. During the Cold War, the United States and its allies undertook policies to "contain" the communist threat. However, during Eisenhower's administration, he instituted what is what he called the "New Look" policy. The political scientist Samuel Huntington has noted that:

"The basic military fact of the New Look was the overwhelming American superiority in nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them." Between 1953 and 1955, the United States could have destroyed the Soviet Union with little likelihood of serious reprisal. The fact that America did not do so indicated the basic restraint of the Eisenhower administration...<sup>1</sup>

NSC 162/2 outlines the New Look policy. The main goal of the policy was to be able to maintain the economic strength of the United States. In addition to a dependence upon nuclear capabilities, the New Look required the construction of firm alliances with “free nations.” This is why the establishment of the European Defense Community was one of Dulles’ primary objectives.<sup>2</sup> The policy meant that the United States would watch as the Russians developed their nuclear capabilities.

The Russian’s build-up would allow them to develop the power to destroy the United States, but not the ability to defend against American nuclear assault. This would prevent the direct aggression between the two super powers, but would most certainly bring about wars on peripheral fronts. Because of the almost complete dependency upon nuclear weapons and delivery system development, Eisenhower was able to decrease the total number of American troops and to bring American troops home from Korea. This also made him unwilling to dedicate American troops abroad. This policy matched up with the general American sentiment of wanting to keep “the boys at home.”

Not everyone supported President Eisenhower’s policy. American military leaders, including the Joint Chiefs, believed that the plan forced American military into a stand of “all or nothing.”<sup>3</sup> To a large extent extent, this was true. There was not much room for a variable response. However, the ends of the policy matched up with the desire of the American people not to have their sons dedicated to wars abroad. It was by using the threat of nuclear weapons that President Eisenhower was able to negotiate a ceasefire in Korea, as he had promised during his campaign. At the time, few military leaders saw Korea as a military victory and some American military leaders resigned in the face of the President’s policies to cut the size of the military. It was under these policies that President Eisenhower made his decision not to dedicate troops in Vietnam.

During the Second World War, Ho Chi Minh led the Vietminh and viciously who had opposed the Japanese in Vietnam. After the Japanese surrender, Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnamese independence and established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Unfortunately, the Allies had different plans for the Vietnam. At the Potsdam Conference, the Allied leaders decided that they would divide along the 15<sup>th</sup> parallel and that the British would maintain the south while the Chinese maintained the north. Unfortunately, General Douglas Gracey, the British Commander in charge, was determined to restore control of the Vietnamese populace to the French. Despite the fact that the Vietnamese were already tangling with imperialistic policies of Jean Cédile, a French bureaucrat, the Vietminh government believed that by maintaining a temperate attitude they might win Allied support. Cédile, meanwhile had been sent by de Gaulle and ordered to reject all requests for Vietnamese self-rule. However, as Gracey imposed more and more regulations against the Vietminh, the hopes for support began to wane. On September 24, the Vietminh started to fight back. Stanley Karnow describes the scene.

...Saigon was paralyzed. Electricity and water supplies halted. Shops were shut and offices closed, trams stood still and even rickshaws had disappeared from the deserted streets... ...The crackle of gunfire and the thud of mortars soon echoed across the city, as armed Vietminh squads attacked the airport, burned the central market, and stormed the local prison...<sup>4</sup>

This new level of violence placed the British in an awkward position. An immediate withdrawal would create tension with the French or even cause problems within their own colonial possessions. However, the British could not justify the support of imperial aggression to their American or Chinese Allies. The British decided to pass the problem entirely to the French.

In London, a senior Foreign Office expert outlined Britain's dilemma in a confidential memorandum. The British could not continue to back the French in Vietnam without alienating China and anticolonial American opinion. But a straightforward retreat from Saigon would dismay the French, and perhaps also spur dissidence in British possessions. He therefore proposed "to get French troops into southern Indochina with the utmost dispatch, and, after turning it over to them, to withdraw our forces as soon as possible"—which is exactly what happened.<sup>5</sup>

American aid to the French against the Vietminh began under the Truman Administration. By 1953, the United States was already paying 40% of the cost for the French war cost in Indochina.<sup>6</sup>

The French employed the same grand strategy that they had used to secure their African possessions. They captured, built up, and fortified key centers and villages as strong points. Unfortunately, the jungles of Vietnam were much more useful to insurgent forces than the deserts of North Africa. Melanie Billings-Yun explains the French efforts:

While government troops quickly gained control of nearly all of Vietnam's urban centers, they were unable to use them effectively as bases from which to control the rest of the country. Hit-and-run guerilla raids emanating from rural sanctuaries never ceased.<sup>7</sup>

Further, the French were limited in their use of conscription forces overseas. An amendment to the Budget Plan of 1950 allowed conscripted troops only to serve in Algeria, France, and French-occupied areas of Germany. This drastically limited the number of troops that were available to fight in Vietnam. Unfortunately, after the cease-fire in Korea, Chinese support poured into North Vietnam in the form of Russian weaponry and military training. This meant that time was working against the French. Just before action at Dien Bien Phu, there was no longer any illusion that the French could emerge completely victorious. The only remaining option was to force the Vietnamese into a pitched battle, where, in theory, the French could destroy a large portion of the strengthening Vietnamese force. Each side was simply attempting to gain a strong foothold before the Geneva Conference where a peace settlement was to be negotiated. With Dien Bien Phu, the French were attempting to secure a position of strength from which to negotiate. In his book, Hell in a Very Small Place, Bernard B. Fall clearly defines the French strategy for Dien Bien Phu:

...if the French could induce the enemy to a face up to them in a set-piece battle by offering the VietMinh a target sufficiently tempting to pounce at, but sufficiently strong to resist the onslaught once it came. It was an incredible gamble, for upon its success hinged not only the fate of the French forces in Indochina and France's political role in Southeast Asia, but the survival of Viet-Nam as a non-Communist state....<sup>8</sup>

General Navarre had completely convinced the French Government that Dien Bien Phu was the perfect stronghold. However, President Eisenhower was convinced that the fortress would not withstand the coming assault. The President was dismayed with the way that the French had handled the entire engagement. He believed that the French had not done enough to build an indigenous Vietnamese military force with Vietnamese officers. He was also furious that the French were so willing to accept American aid without accepting military advice. Here, Eisenhower's evaluation of the situation at Dien Bien Phu made clear by Billings-Yun in Decision Against War:

...he assailed Navarre's decision to make his last stand before Geneva at Dien Bien Phu—a valley clearing surrounded on all sides by thick, camouflaging jungle, with no roads in or out for supply, reinforcement, or retreat.<sup>9</sup>

On March 20, General Paul Ely, France's chief of staff, briefed the Americans on the situation at Dien Bien Phu. The bombardment had begun on March 13 and Navarre quickly lost three of his twelve battalions. Additionally, the Vietnamese took three northern strong points and temporarily managed to disable both of the airstrips (the only means for the French to re-supply).

For years, history described President Eisenhower as a tired old general dominated by powerful personalities within his administration, who American people had elected due to his tremendous popularity. These early historical accounts of his administration considered his time in office inactive. Historians William V. Shannon, Marquis Childs, Richard Rovere all depicted Eisenhower in this light. Because of the release of new information, it has only revisionist historians assert that Eisenhower was an influential leader, who led from behind the scenes, in order to secure better expert information from within his cabinet and preserve his personal popularity, both foreign and domestic.<sup>10</sup> While at times the autonomy that he gave his subordinates may have worked against him, Eisenhower, in many ways, used his subordinates to gather information. This view of Eisenhower is central to the understanding of the significance of the decision. Also, why the decision can be attributed to President Eisenhower, more so than President Eisenhower's administration.

General Ely came to the United States just after the beginning of the battle at Dien Bien Phu. Ely's visit was the source of much of the confusion surrounding the positions of the United States and the French governments and their miscommunication. Ely's original mission was to secure the promise of United States military intervention in the event of overt Chinese military involvement. Additionally, the French government desired American political power with them at Geneva. The US could offer certain concessions such as recognizing the People's Republic of China. Besides the maintaining the possible threat of American military assistance to strengthen their bargaining position, France did not yet want direct military intervention because this would prolong the struggle. They believed further fighting would only damage their hold in Indochina, especially in the United States put ground forces into the area. Yet, they were confident that they would be able to place themselves into a stronger position before the Geneva Conference.

Surprisingly, the Chinese, out of fear that Americans would take the place of the French if a peace was not established, were also pressuring Ho Chi Minh into peace accords.<sup>11</sup> However, Ely's mission changed due to the quickly deteriorating situation at

Dien Bien Phu. He began to seek any aid possible in order to restore the crumbling French position. He came to the President requesting nearly one hundred aircraft with technicians. In the meeting, the President, after hearing Ely's description of the situation, instructed Admiral Radford, his CJCS, to give him the equipment that he requested. Ely misunderstood the President and believed he was giving the Defense establishment full leave to aid the French with all possible resources. Admiral Radford, who wanted to expand the war in Indochina, nurtured this misunderstanding. General Ely met with the President, Secretary of State Dulles, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each time he met with an indication that the United States was not entirely willing to intervene on behalf of the French, Admiral Radford would encourage him that he still had the President's support. At this point, Secretary Dulles and the Joint Chiefs, with the exception of Radford, did not support intervention and were hard-pressed to justify continuing to supply the French with their requested materiel. However, before General Ely flew back to France, Admiral Radford proposed a plan called Operation Vulture. This plan called for massive air strikes by American air units in the area immediately surrounding Dien Bien Phu. The support would be limited to this one specific incident and would be in response to the escalated Chinese aid to Vietnamese. General Ely took this good news and reported to Paris, believing that he had the support of President Eisenhower. The Eisenhower administration was still primarily concerned with the "domino theory" and believed that an even a partial victory in Vietnam would lead to a chain reaction that would lead all of Asia becoming communist.

Eisenhower instructed Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford to go before congress to determine congress's position on intervention, unilaterally or otherwise. Eisenhower would not allow Dulles to go forward with a prepared resolution, because he wished to know what the feelings of the element of government most quickly affected by popular opinion. He also wished to use this as a safeguard against being labeled the man who decided not to support the French. If his representatives took the case to the legislature and the congressmen were largely unsupportive, Eisenhower could not be held responsible for inaction by the French or by the congressmen supportive of intervention. He would rightly claim that it was the decision of the congress. During the meeting, a consensus was reached among the legislators that the intervention could not be unilateral; they did not want the United States to bear most of the burden as in Korea.<sup>12</sup>

This meeting is particularly important because it clearly puts Eisenhower as the leader who is directing the decision not to intervene in Vietnam. In her book, Decision Against War, Billings-Yun asserts that there were critically times when Eisenhower used his personal credibility to put through legislation or direct military policy and that, in this particular instance, he did not. He realized that Dulles and Radford would be unable to convince them alone. This gave him the opportunity to know the position of the congress and conserve his personal credibility and popularity.<sup>13</sup> In his book, The Hidden Hand Presidency, Fred Greenstein describes Eisenhower's leadership:

Eisenhower employed five strategies: hidden hand leadership; instrumental use of language; the complimentary strategies of refusing in public to "engage in personalities" but nevertheless privately basing actions on personality analyses; and the selective practice of delegation.<sup>14</sup>

At this point, President Eisenhower had only acknowledged the slightest possibility of assisting the French at Dien Bien Phu with air strikes. This is because he

was almost certain that such an action would not be one contained incident and that if he dedicated American forces to such an intervention, it would be the beginning of World War III with America chained to the weakened French while combating Vietnamese and possibly Chinese forces. It was for this reason that Eisenhower decided that the action could not take place unilaterally. President Eisenhower once said:

...he “did not see how the United States or other free world nations could go all-out in support of the Associated States without UN approval and assistance.”<sup>15</sup>

Meanwhile, the Secretary of State took a new view of the situation. While Dulles did not believe that Dien Bien Phu was of especially great significance itself, he believed that it would be necessary for the United States to take on a greater role in the region of Indochina. Throughout the course of the First Indochinese War, Dulles, in exchange for money and materiel, had been gleaning concessions from the French in the form of legislation toward independence for the Indochinese states and support for the EDC. However, at the battle of Dien Bien Phu, it was entirely probable that the French effort to battle communist forces would be irreversibly damaged, likely to a point of which they will be unable to secure another foothold. This meant that to continue battling the communist threat, the United States would have to take on a greater role in the region. Further, Dulles wanted to discourage the French from attempting to negotiate a peace that would divide the country. He believed that such a partition or division would inevitably lead to the further spread of communism in Asia. After a meeting between the President, Admiral Radford, and key members of Congress, Dulles gave a speech to the Overseas Press Club. This speech using his typical vagueness indicated that the United States was willing to support the French, possibly with nuclear weaponry. Billings-Yun quotes Secretary Douglas:

Peace has to be worked for and planned for. Sometimes it is necessary in war to take risks to win victory. The chances for peace are usually bettered by letting a potential aggressor know in advance where his aggression could lead them.<sup>16</sup>

The speech may have well served a few purposes. Firstly, it would boost the French’s resolve by making them believe that the US was ready and willing to support their embattled garrison. Second, this outright, apparent support for the French would further cause the Chinese support of the Vietnamese to continue to pressure the Vietnamese to seek out a peace settlement. However, the drawbacks to the speech may have well overcome the benefits. It caused huge amount of confusion. Newspapers, foreign officers, and even congressional representatives debated the meaning of “united action.” This speech may have caused the French to over estimate the American resolve to support them at Dien Bien Phu. Additionally, it may have caused the British to see the US as overly willing to go to war in Asia. Under President Eisenhower’s instructions to test the willingness of the French and the English to a multilateral action, Dulles flew to London to propose a joint-military intervention in Vietnam. Dulles returned to Washington feeling that there was a strong possibility of such an intervention.

Despite Dulles’ good feelings, British Foreign Secretary Eden, eventually, rejected the proposal because the Geneva Conference was so near at hand, there was little that an allied force could do to assist the French garrison, and there would not be strong support of such action from the entire British commonwealth.<sup>17</sup> However, there was one

specific concern that Eden did not specifically voice to Dulles and that was that he simply did not trust the United States to follow through.

...Eden simply did not trust Dulles and the Americans not to leave British forces in the lurch. He believed that, if the Administration found itself committed to a politically awkward campaign, it might well decide to withdraw and leave everybody else to follow suit as best they could. This was a particular danger, as London saw the position, in that another Asian campaign would be so desperately unpopular with American public opinion coming so soon after the frustrations of Korea, while at the same time there would be little chance of its succeeding, unless it did receive the fullest and most uninhibited backing that the United States could give it.<sup>18</sup>

After he visited the UK, Dulles went to discuss the conditions of possible intervention with the Foreign Minister of the Laniel Government in France, Georges Bidault. While Dulles was abroad hoping to gain support for “united action,” Radford was making efforts to gain support for Operation Vulture. His efforts to convince the Joint-Chiefs fell flat because they were not willing to believe that such military action could be contained simply to air strikes or to Dien Bien Phu. Because of this and their limited numbers of troops, they did not feel that the American military would be adequately prepared for a war in Vietnam.<sup>19</sup> Radford found himself alone among the JCS in his willingness to save Dien Bien Phu with air strikes.

The Laniel Government, having been convinced of the opportunity by General Ely’s report, awaited word from Gen. Nevarre before requesting American assistance. A meeting between Secretary Dulles and French Ambassador Bonnet further supported the belief that the US was willing to support the French. The Ambassador questioned Dulles about the United States government’s willingness to support the French unilaterally. Dulles reminded the Ambassador of the United States history of supporting the French in times of crisis and that all of America’s allies shared the responsibility of stopping the spread of communism in Asia. However, when the Secretary met with the Ambassadors from New Zealand and Australia, they refused to support “united action” without British support.

General Nevarre finally reported that Dien Bien Phu would be lost if there was not immediate assistance. Prime Minister Laniel responded by personally requesting unilateral, American intervention. Ultimately, due to a lack of willingness from allies or from congress to support a unilateral intervention, the United States declined military intervention to aid the French at Dien Bien Phu.

The main reason that the French were able to take a bargaining position at Geneva is because the threat of American intervention still existed. Though Secretary Dulles attended a portion of the conference, he did not do so in an official capacity, as the US still did not recognize the People’s Republic of China. However, Dulles made efforts to rally the Allies in order to pose a united front in bargaining with the Communists. These efforts ultimately failed due to British unwillingness to commit to possible intervention. The country of Vietnam was divided at the 17<sup>th</sup> parallel on July 17, 1954.

Eisenhower realized that the hearts and minds of the people of Vietnam would be central to an American military operation. He understood the history of the Vietnamese people’s feelings toward the United States and that if the US entered into the conflict now, on behalf of the French; the Vietnamese would view the Americans as a new arm of

an imperialistic assault on Vietnamese sovereignty. The French government could not justify making a statement that they intended to grant independence to the Indochinese possessions, because the war was primarily fought in the cause of maintaining the French Empire. Eisenhower describes the position of the French.

As far as I could tell, this reluctance seemed to have its source in the French conviction that making an all-out statement would weaken their leadership in the war and might have serious effects in other portions of the French Empire, including Algeria; moreover, the civil officials with whom I often talked invariably agreed that while in this one special situation their difficulties could be greatly diminished by making clear their intention to offer freedom to Indochina, they fear that this announcement of voluntary withdrawal from the area during hostilities would be a tremendous blow to French prestige and influence in the world.<sup>20</sup>

This marked the conflict as a “domestic difficulty” between France and a portion of the French Empire. This limited global support for the French and crippled the ability of the French to win support of the Vietnamese population.

Delay or equivocation in implementing complete independence could only serve to bolster the Communist claim that this was in reality a war to preserve colonialism. To American ears the first French pronouncements, soon made to the world, were a distinct step forward, but it was almost impossible to make the average Vietnamese peasant realize that the French, under whose rule his people had lived for some eighty years, were really fighting in the cause of freedom, while the Vietminh, people of their own ethnic origin were fighting on the side of slavery.<sup>21</sup>

Clearly, the inability of the French forces to convince the Vietnamese population that they were a liberating force hampered their effectiveness against insurgents and guerilla tactics. The Navarre Plan was designed to put more of the weight of the military commitment on the indigenous Vietnamese forces to combat the Vietminh. John Foster Dulles explains that the support of the Vietnamese is more important than escalated American intervention.

Victory on the battlefield would be won not by American bombs, but by building up indigenous forces and giving them a nation of their own to fight for; then the Vietnamese themselves would let loose an all-out, nationwide offensive to annihilate the communists.<sup>22</sup>

Commitment to undoing the damage and taking on full military responsibility for Indochina was not a responsibility that Eisenhower was willing to accept after campaigning on a platform to get the United States out of Korea and decreasing military spending. In his memoirs, General Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, explains the huge amount of resources that it will take to combat the Vietminh.

The land was a land of rice paddy and jungle—particularly adapted to the guerilla-type warfare...we could have won, if we had been willing to pay the tremendous cost in men and money that such intervention would have required.<sup>23</sup>

This particular situation of a well-entrenched enemy with hearts and minds dedicated to fighting for Vietnamese independence would require a huge amount of American soldiers

and resources in order to conduct a successful intervention. Therefore, Eisenhower could not authorize air strikes knowing that they would only dedicate the United States to a new war in Asia that the public was not ready to support.

Eisenhower developed a policy known as the New Look. In this policy, Eisenhower favored decreasing military resources in favor of domestic economic development. The policy led to ending the war in Korea and won Eisenhower substantial popular support at home. However, the decrease in military spending caused a great deal of frustration from Eisenhower's military advisors, most notably, members of the Joint Chiefs.

Under no circumstances was Eisenhower going to send American troops back onto the Asian mainland less than a year after signing an armistice in Korea. Even had he wanted to do that, the New Look precluded such an effort—the troops simply were not available.<sup>24</sup>

Eisenhower believed that a decision to intervene at Dien Bien Phu would not end with air strikes. He would be dedicating the American people to a new long, bloody conflict in Asia. Eisenhower understood that a conflict of this magnitude should not be undertaken and could not be successful without popular support.

The limitations placed upon Eisenhower by his own New Look policy and the unwillingness of the French to cooperate with American demands forced Eisenhower to depend on the French forces with their loyal Vietnamese to “contain” the spread of communist rule in Asia. However, the motivation of the French to fight in Indochina was not to contain communism. It was to maintain the possession of the French Empire and the greater glory of France. However, with these overtly imperialistic motivations, the United States and Allies were unable to assist the French with troops and France refused any such assistance from any nation other than the United States, but Eisenhower continued to finance the conflict in the name of “containment” and in order to win the support of France for the EDC. Further, France would not allow the United States to direct forces or control the way in which the finances were spent. If the French overtly proclaimed that they intended to liberate the Vietnamese and grant them their own national sovereignty, the effort would lose popular support and would be unable to continue the fight. However, as the soldiers on the ground in Vietnam began to realize that in order to win the conflict, what they were fighting for would need to change, they began to lose spirit. Navarre himself noted that the nationalist Vietnamese forces outfought his soldiers.

Was it not Gen. Navarre himself who, in his later memoirs, said of his own army that “they were good and devoted men but they were not exactly the soldiers of the French Revolution”? Had not a senior officer from Dien Bien Phu been overheard to say in the prison camp that “we were fighting for our professional honor and in the end, for our skins. But they, the enemy, were fighting for their country.”<sup>25</sup>

In his decision not to intervene at Dien Bien Phu, President Eisenhower displayed a clear understanding of hearts and minds and the necessity of domestic popular support. He understood that the American people were not yet ready to support another war of containment in Asia. He understood that the motivations and position of the Vietminh would not allow the difficulties experienced by the French to be ameliorated by a few air strikes from American aircraft. If the United States intervened, American ground forces

would be necessary and the Chinese and Russian support to the Vietminh would become more overt. America would be committed to another Korea, without promise of multilateral support and without support from the American public. Eisenhower believed that the US would not be able successfully conduct another war in Asia, not because we did not have the military and economic power, but because the necessary popular support for such a sustained conflict did not exist.

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<sup>1</sup> Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938(New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1984), 136.

<sup>2</sup> Ira Chernus, Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace (The College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 2002), 56-60.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 139.

<sup>4</sup> Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1983), 149.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 150.

<sup>6</sup> Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu in 1938(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1988), 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>8</sup> Bernard B. Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place(Philadelphia, PN: Lippincott Company, 1966), ix.

<sup>9</sup> Billings-Yun, Decision Against War, 24.

<sup>10</sup> Mary S. McAuliffe, "Eisenhower, the President," *The Journal of American History*, no. 3 (1981)

<sup>11</sup> Billings-Yun, Decision Against War, 30-31.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 94.

<sup>14</sup> Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1982), 57.

<sup>15</sup> Billings-Yun, Decision Against War, 54. (190<sup>th</sup> meeting of NSC, March 25, 1954, FRUS, pp. 1163-1168)

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 62. (Overseas Press Club Speech)

<sup>17</sup> Richard Goold-Adams, John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1962), 126.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 126.

<sup>19</sup> Billings-Yun, Decision Against War, 68.

<sup>20</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change 1953-56(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company), 336.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 337.

<sup>22</sup> Billings-Yun, Decision Against War, 58.

<sup>23</sup> Matthew P. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew P. Ridgway(New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 276.

<sup>24</sup> Steven E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President(New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 174.

<sup>25</sup> Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, 440.